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1. Introduction 
Empirical studies on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) measure the wealth effects of such 
transactions for shareholders using two different methodologies. One such methodology is the 
event study methodology, which may focus on the short run, i.e. the announcement effect to 
M&As, or the long run. The other methodology consists of focusing on improvements in 
accounting or operating performance subsequent to the acquisition. Table 1 summarises the 
results from the main event studies on M&As. Panel A shows that short run event studies find 
either significantly negative abnormal returns (e.g., Servaes 1991) or insignificant abnormal 
returns earned by the bidding shareholders. The results obtained from long run event studies are 
highly dependent on whether the acquisition is a merger, i.e. a stock swap, or a tender offer, i.e. a 
cash offer. Still, Panel B suggests that, even by keeping the type of acquisition fixed, there is 
disagreement as to whether M&As create or destroy value. For example, while Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) find significant 3-year cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of -4% for 
mergers Mitchell and Stafford (2000) do not find any significant CARs for the same length of 
event window.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Similar to the event studies on M&As, those studies that measure the shareholder wealth effects 
by accounting performance tend to find a variety of performance outcomes. While the majority of 
studies (e.g., Andrade et al. 2001) find an improvement in accounting performance following the 
acquisition some studies do not find any significant improvement (e.g., Dickerson et al. 1997). 
Yet, at least another study finds a significant deterioration in accounting performance 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer 1989). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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The above review of event studies and accounting performance studies on the wealth gains 
accruing to the bidding shareholders gives rise to two stylised facts. First and in a nutshell, 
studies accounting performance paint a rosier picture of the wealth effects of M&As accruing to 
bidders than event studies. Second and more importantly, both types of studies suggest that there 
is great diversity in terms of performance outcomes.  
Explaining this diversity of performance outcomes will be the aim of this paper. More precisely, 
we shall study each of the four possible combinations of positive or negative abnormal stock 
returns and abnormal accounting performance. In a first step, we shall compare the bidder, bid 
and target characteristics across each of these four combinations. In a second step, we shall 
identify possible motives behind acquisitions characterised by each performance outcome. In 
other words, can each combination of stock returns and accounting performance be explained by 
a particular motive behind the merger transaction? 
While our paper has some similarities with the literature on the motives behind takeovers (see 
e.g. Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993), it is also different from that literature in at least three 
major aspects. First, while Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) focus on stock returns, we study 
both stock returns and accounting performance. The reason for this is that the different 
combinations of stock returns and accounting performance may be the performance outcome of 
different acquisition motives. Second, in addition to the three motives considered by Berkovitch 
and Narayanan (the motives they consider are synergies, hubris and agency problems), we 
identify preemption and the overvaluation of the bidder’s stock as additional motives. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the data sources, the 
sample selection, the measures of performance as well as bidder, bid and target characteristics 
used in this study. Section 3 discusses the empirical results; the aim being on identifying bidder, 
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bid and target characteristics that may explain a particular performance outcome. Section 4 
reconciles our findings as to the differences across the four performance outcomes in terms of 
bidder, bid and target characteristics with possible theories on acquisition motives. We find 
evidence that combinations of performance outcomes are dominated by a particular motive 
driving the acquisition. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data sources, sample selection and measurement of performance 
This section is structured as follows. We first explain the data sources used and the sample 
selection process. We then discuss the measurement of abnormal accounting performance, 
followed by a discussion of the measurement of stock performance. Finally, we define the bidder, 
bid and target characteristics used in this study. 
2.1 Data sources and sample selection 
The initial list of M&As was obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum. We analyse the 
performance of US acquisitions that were announced and completed (Item STAT) between 
January 1989 and December 2008.1 We then proceed by applying the following filters to the 
sample. 
We retain only those acquisitions where the share of the acquirer in the target firm’s equity was 
below 50% before and above 50% after the transaction (Items PHDA and 
A_POSTMERGEOWN_PCT). Alternatively, the acquirer had to buy 50% of the shares 
outstanding during the acquisition process (Item PC TOWN). As Morck et al. (1990) argue that 
the inclusion of small transactions can bias the measurement of performance, we only include 
those acquisitions with an absolute transaction value (Item VAL) of at least US$ 50 million (Item 
                                                 
1
 Transactions have to be completed by 31 December 2008 as we require accounting data for at least three years 
following the year of the completion. 
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VAL). This is in line with Harford (2005) who also excludes small mergers. The acquirer and the 
target firm are both US corporations and the acquirer must be listed on a US stock exchange. We 
exclude international (Item MATYPE IMA) and overseas mergers (Item MATYPE OMA). We 
exclude mergers involving banks or insurance companies as their financial accounts (e.g. cash 
flow) are not directly comparable to those of firms from other industries. For acquirers to be 
included in our final sample stock price and accounting data must be available from CRSP 
(Center for Research in Security Prices) or alternatively from COMPUSTAT for the three years 
before as well as the three years after the acquisition. Furthermore, information on the method of 
payment of the acquirer must be available from SDC. This selection process results in a sample 
of 9,180 acquisitions. From those 9,180 acquisitions we only retain single bids/acquisitions, i.e. 
the first bid in a series of acquisitions by the same bidder. This results in a final sample of 4,547. 
2.2 Measurement of the bidder’s abnormal accounting performance 
Our measure of accounting performance is based on operating cash flow. In line with Barber and 
Lyon’s (1996) recommendation, it is scaled by sales.2 The operating cash flow is defined as sales 
(CRSP Item 12) minus the cost of goods sold (Item 41) minus selling and administrative 
expenses (Item 189) plus depreciation and goodwill amortization expenses (Item 196). The 
operating cash flow is then divided by sales at the end of the previous year.  
We compare the pre- and post-acquisition performance of the acquirer with the performance of 
two different portfolios of matched firms. The procedure closely follows Barber and Lyon (1996) 
who also use the portfolio approach, and to a lesser extent Ghosh (2001) who uses the matched 
firm approach. The first portfolio consists of all the firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the 
acquirer and of a similar size (same quintile of book value of total assets for the last available 
                                                 
2
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. The results are qualitatively similar if we scale the 
operating cash flow by the book value of assets. These results are available upon request. 
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year before the merger announcement as the acquirer) and pre-event performance (same quintile 
of operating cash flow ratio (return on assets) for the last available year before the merger 
announcement as the acquirer). This portfolio is called the “industry-matched portfolio” in what 
follows. The second portfolio of matched firms consists of all the firms with a different two-digit 
SIC code than that of the acquirer, but of a similar size (same quintile of book value of total 
assets for the last available year before the merger announcement as the acquirer) and pre-event 
performance (same quintile of operating cash flow ratio (return on assets) for the last available 
year before the merger announcement as the acquirer). This portfolio is called the “non-industry-
matched portfolio”. 
Importantly, both of our peer groups or portfolios are matched by pre-event performance. Indeed, 
Barber and Lyon (1996) show that, when the sample firms experience above- or below-average 
pre-event performance, it is important to match the peer firms by pre-event performance. Indeed, 
it is likely that our sample firms experience above-average pre-event performance. Table 3 
investigates this issue in detail. The table reports the mean and median cash flow returns for the 
bidders for each of the three years before and after the acquisition. Furthermore, the table also 
reports the mean and median differences between each bidder’s cash flow returns and that for the 
industry-matched portfolio. Finally, we also compute the mean and median for the equivalent 
difference based on the non-industry-matched portfolio. The table shows that there is a drop in 
the cash flow return after the acquisition relative to both the industry-matched and non-industry 
matched portfolio. This is the case for all three measures. Our results are similar to those of 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and those of Dickerson et al. (1997) who find a similar drop in 
industry-adjusted performance, of about 2%. The industry as well as the non-industry adjusted 
performance is significantly negative in all the years subsequent to the completion of the 
acquisition, but significantly positive in most of the years in the pre-merger period. These 
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patterns suggest that it is important to select the peer firms by matching them by pre-event 
performance with the sample firms. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
2.3 Measurement of the bidder’s abnormal stock returns at the announcement 
We measure the short-term abnormal stock price performance of the acquirer by calculating the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) based on the event study methodology. The tables in the 
paper are based on the [-2;+2] window with day 0 being the announcement day of the acquisition 
and day -2 and day +2 being the second day preceding and the second day following the 
announcement, respectively. In addition, we have checked the robustness of our results using 
various other window lengths (e.g. [-10;+10]). The daily abnormal returns are defined as follows: 
i,t i,t i i m,tAR R R       
where Ri,t and Rm,t denote the return on stock i and the market, respectively, on day t. The 
parameters αi and βi are the intercept and slope estimate, respectively, obtained from the market-
model regression. The estimation window for this regression is based on the 255 trading days 
preceding day -41. The CRSP value-weighted performance index, which is a broad index, is used 
as the proxy for the market portfolio.  
We measure the average cross-sectional cumulative abnormal returns as follows: 
, ,
1
1T n
T i t
t i
CAR AR
n
  
     
 
where τ is the first day of the event window (e.g. day -10), T is the last day of the window (e.g. 
day +10) and n is the number of acquisitions in the sample. 
2.4. Bidder, bid and target characteristics 
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The variables used in this paper include bidder characteristics, bid characteristics and target 
characteristics. The bidder characteristics include leverage and asset tangibility, the acquirer’s 
value (measured by the ratio of the book value of equity to its market value; Tobin’s Q; and the 
price-earnings ratio)3 and corporate governance quality (the Gompers et al. 2013 CG index, their 
CG dictatorship index, and the Bebchuk et al. 2009 entrenchment index).4 The bid characteristics 
include the form of payment for the target shareholders (cash, stock or other payment),5 analysts’ 
revisions as a response to the acquisition announcement (the median, the mean and a dummy 
indicating whether the number of analysts making an upward revision exceeds the number of 
analysts making a downward revision) and the industry announcement effect of the acquisition. 
Finally, the target characteristics include industry closeness between target and acquirer, leverage 
and the target CG index (Gompers et al. 2003). The definitions for all the variables (as well as 
their variants) used in this study are reported in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
3. Empirical results 
First, based on the signs of the CARs and abnormal accounting performance (measured by the 
difference between the average ratio of non-industry adjusted (industry adjusted) operating cash 
flow to sales and the equivalent average for the three years preceding the announcement year), 
we categorize each acquisition according to the following four types. These types are Type I 
(positive abnormal stock returns and as well as positive abnormal accounting performance), Type 
II (positive abnormal stock returns and negative abnormal accounting performance), Type III 
                                                 
3
 These include the following variants: logarithmic form and market adjusted and industry adjusted. See Table 4 for 
further details. 
4
 A high value for each of these three indices signifies weak corporate governance whereas a low value signifies 
strong corporate governance. See Table 4 for further details. 
5
 These are in the form of percentages as well as in the form of dummy variables indicating whether a majority of the 
acquisition payment is in cash, stock, and of another type, respectively. See Table 4 for further details. 
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(negative abnormal stock returns and positive abnormal accounting performance) and Type IV 
acquisitions (negative abnormal returns as well as negative accounting performance). The 
percentage of Type I acquisitions is for the industry-matched portfolio 61.42% and for the non-
industry matched portfolio 61.49%. The equivalent percentages for the Type II acquisitions are 
6.50% and 6.43%, for the Type III acquisitions 19.39% and 20.17% and for the Type IV 
acquisitions 12.69% and 11.91%, respectively. Second, via a univariate analysis we determine 
whether each of the four types of acquisitions has significantly different bidder, bid and target 
characteristics.  
Table 5 focuses on the non-industry adjusted operating cash flow when measuring accounting 
performance whereas Table 6 focuses on industry adjusted operating cash flow. In detail, in 
Table 5 the accounting performance of each bidder is adjusted by its industry-matched portfolio 
performance. The industry-matched portfolio consists of all the firms with a different two-digit 
SIC code than the acquirer, but of a similar size and pre-event performance. Accounting 
performance is measured as the difference between the bidder’s average accounting performance 
across the three years following the year of the announcement and the average accounting 
performance across the three years preceding that year minus the corresponding difference for the 
matched portfolio. In other words, accounting performance measures the possible improvement 
in performance from the three-year period before the acquisition to the three-year period after the 
acquisition, adjusting for the equivalent improvement in performance for the industry-matched 
portfolio. In contrast, in Table 6 the non-industry-matched portfolio consists of all the firms with 
a different two-digit SIC code than that of the acquirer, but of a similar size (same quintile of 
book value of total assets for the last available year before the merger announcement as the 
acquirer) and pre-event performance (same quintile of operating cash flow ratio (return on assets) 
for the last available year before the merger announcement as the acquirer). 
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Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the four types of acquisitions as well as the whole 
sample based on the CARs measured over the [-2;+2] window. The asterisks in the table indicate 
whether there are significant differences in means (medians) between the bidders of a particular 
type of performance outcome and all the remaining bidders. The table shows that Type I 
acquisitions are paid for mainly by cash as the average and median percentages of cash payment 
are 61% and 100%, respectively. Both percentages are significantly higher, at the 1% level, than 
the mean and median of all the other acquirers. In line with this observation, the average 
percentage of stock payment and the proportion of acquisitions paid for mainly by stock are 
significantly lower than the equivalent figures for the whole sample. Further, the number of 
analysts revising the earnings forecasts upwards for the year following the acquisition 
announcement significantly exceeds the number of analysts making a revision in the opposite 
direction at the 1% level (Analysts Revision dummy). Table 6 confirms these patterns when the 
peer group is the industry-matched portfolio. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Type II acquisitions are the first type characterized by a difference in signs between the abnormal 
stock return (which is positive) and the abnormal accounting performance (which is negative). 
Similar to Type I acquisitions, Type II acquisitions are more likely to be paid for by cash rather 
than stock. However contrary to Type I acquisitions, Type II acquisitions tend have significantly 
lower valuations when compared to all other types of acquirers. This pattern is particularly 
pronounced when accounting performance is adjusted by the accounting performance of the 
industry portfolio (see Table 6). There is also some evidence from Table 5 that Type II acquirers 
have significantly better corporate governance – as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003)  index 
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(the higher the index value, the higher is the number of restrictions to shareholder rights) and the 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index (again, the higher the index value, the higher is the 
number of restrictions to shareholder rights) – when compared to all the other acquirers. 
Type III acquisitions have negative abnormal stock returns, but positive abnormal accounting 
performance. In contrast to the two previous types of acquisitions, Type III acquisitions are less 
likely paid for by cash and more likely paid for by stock. In line with this choice of method of 
payment, the acquirers behind such acquisitions have significantly greater valuations than the 
acquirers behind the three other types. This is the case across the various valuation ratios and in 
particular when acquisitions are categorised according to the industry-adjusted accounting 
performance (see Table 6). Most of the various valuation ratios have at least one of the two 
statistics – the average and/or median – which is significantly different from the equivalent 
statistic of the remaining three types of acquisitions at the 5% level. There is also some weak 
evidence, via the mean Dictatorship index (based on the Gompers et al. (2003) index and taking 
only the value of the index if it is at least 14) and 0 otherwise) , that Type III acquirers have 
better corporate governance.  
Finally, Type IV acquisitions also use significantly less cash payment and more stock payment at 
the 5% level (or better) when the industry-matched portfolio results in Table 5 are considered. 
This confirmed, however less significant, when the non-industry-matched portfolio results in 
Table 6 are considered. Type IV acquisitions also have significantly lower bidder valuations (e.g. 
Tobin’s Q) when the categorisation of acquisition types is based on the industry-adjusted 
accounting performance (see Table 6). There is also some evidence (however, only at the 10% 
level of significance) from Table 6 – as reflected by the greater mean value for the Dictatorship 
index – that acquirers behind Type IV acquisitions have weaker corporate governance. 
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Interestingly, Table 5 also suggests (however, only at the 10% level of significance) that analysts 
are more likely to revise their forecasts downwards once the acquisition has been announced.  
We have checked the robustness of our results using various other window lengths. The results 
based on the CARs for longer windows such as [-10;+10] largely confirm the above results for 
the [-2;+2] window.6 Furthermore, we recalculate the CARs using market-adjusted returns rather 
than the returns from the market model. Market adjustment has two advantages, both of which 
are related to the fact that an estimation window prior to the event window is not required. The 
first advantage is that there is no potential contamination of the estimation window such as via 
the occurrence of other acquisition announcements. The second advantage is that the potential 
problem of infrequent or thin trading during the estimation window, and the resulting bias in the 
estimated beta, are no longer an issue. However, the results from the index adjustment are very 
similar to those obtained from using the market model adjustment and they are not reported in 
tabular form.  
4. The link between stock returns and accounting performance for bidders in M&As 
This section provides possible theoretical reasons for the four combinations of positive or 
negative abnormal stock returns and abnormal accounting performance. The first type of 
acquisition is characterised by a greater use of cash as a means of payment, positive analyst 
revisions and some evidence of better corporate governance. Also bearing in mind that there is 
both positive abnormal stock performance and abnormal accounting performance, this type of 
acquisition fits well with the classical textbook motive (see e.g. Grinblatt and Titman (2002)) 
behind acquisitions, i.e. the desire to create shareholder value via the exploitation of synergies 
(economies of scale or scope). This type of acquisition results in a significant improvement in the 
                                                 
6
 The results for the [-10;+10] window are available from the authors upon request. 
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combined firm’s accounting performance as well as positive abnormal stock returns. Brous and 
Kini (1993) and Sudarsanam et al. (2002) argue that earnings forecasts and their revision shortly 
after the takeover announcement provide information on the increase in the bidder’s value due to 
the acquisition. Our empirical analysis shows evidence of such positive revision of earnings 
forecasts in the month following the acquisition for bidders in Type I acquisitions, reflecting the 
creation of future synergies. 
Finding possible motives for Type II acquisitions is trickier as these acquisitions are characterised 
by positive abnormal stock returns, but negative abnormal accounting performance. Nevertheless, 
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) provide a possible theoretical justification for Type II 
acquisitions. They argue that an unprofitable acquisition (as measured by the merged firm’s 
accounting performance) may be motivated by the fact that it is better for the firm to merge with 
another firm and thereby preempt one of its rivals merging with that firm if there are strong 
negative externalities to the industry from a merger.7 This would then explain why the share price 
of the firm increases despite the merger being unprofitable as measured by its accounting 
performance. Indeed, given the negative externalities from the merger, it is best to be part of a 
merger (i.e. to be an insider) rather than to be affected by a rival’s merger (i.e. to be an outsider). 
The pre-merger stock price of the firm would then reflect the possibility that the firm may end up 
as an outsider whereas the increase in the stock price at the merger announcement could be 
explained by the fact that the alternative to an unprofitable merger would be even worse. Still, we 
do not observe a negative industry announcement effect to Type II acquisitions. Indeed, such a 
negative announcement returns would reflect the negative externalities of the acquisition. 
                                                 
7
 Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) provide two examples of mergers driven by the motive of preemption. The first 
example is Northwestern’s acquisition of a 51% voting stake in Continental. Northwestern consented not to vote for 
its stock for six years and not to intervene in the management of Continental. However, crucially, it kept the right to 
veto mergers of Continental with other airlines. The second example is Volvo’s failed attempt of acquiring Scania. 
At the time, Volvo stated that its main motive for taking over Scania was to prevent others from doing so. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that Type II acquisitions have significantly lower valuation ratios – except 
when these are industry adjusted – fits in well with the preemption motive. Indeed, on the whole 
these industries are characterised by low firm valuations, reflecting a mature or shrinking market, 
which in turn makes preemption a rational, shareholder value increasing motive for acquisitions. 
Type III acquisitions have a negative abnormal stock return and positive abnormal accounting 
performance. Our descriptive analysis showed that this type of acquisitions is less likely to be 
paid for by cash and more likely to be paid for by stock. Importantly, the various valuation ratios 
suggest that acquirers behind these acquisitions are overvalued. This type of acquisition can be 
explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model based on the bidder’s overvalued stock.8 Their 
model is based on temporary mispricing in the securities market. The model assumes that there 
are some firms that are overvalued at some point in time. In the long run, however, the market 
realizes there is mispricing and the firms’ stock prices decrease to their fundamental values. The 
CEOs of the overvalued companies are assumed to be rational and to be aware of the temporary 
overvaluation. While Shleifer and Vishny do not explicitly make this assumption, we assume that 
the CEOs act in the interest of the current shareholders by locking in real assets, i.e. by using 
their overvalued stock to acquire an undervalued (or at least less overvalued) company. The 
market then realizes that the stock was overvalued, but does not realize the full extent of the 
overvaluation. As a result, the stock price of the acquirer declines slightly in the short run to 
return only to the fundamental value of the merged firm in the long run. As Shleifer and Vishny’s 
model does not make any predictions as to the accounting profitability of the merger, it would be 
possible to observe mergers with negative synergies, but that are in line with the predictions of 
                                                 
8
 Effectively, Shleifer and Vishny’s model combines two separate hypotheses into a single one. These hypotheses are 
the means of payment hypothesis (Loughran and Vijh 1997) and the profit extrapolation hypothesis (Rau and 
Vermaelen 1998). The former states that bidders with overvalued equity will pay for acquisitions with stock whereas 
those with undervalued equity will pay with cash. According to the profit extrapolation hypothesis, the stock market 
wrongly extrapolates the bidder’s past performance of so-called glamour firms, i.e. firms with high market to book 
value ratios.  
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their model. However, given our assumption that managers act in the best interests of the 
shareholders, such mergers are only possible if the acquirer is extremely overvalued which would 
compensate for the loss of profitability. The question that arises is whether our assumption that 
the managers act in the interests of their existing shareholders is indeed justified. Although the 
answer is not unequivocal, Table 6 nevertheless suggests that acquirers undertaking Type III 
acquisitions have either better corporate governance (when the Dictatorship index is considered) 
or corporate governance that is not significantly different (including not significantly worse) from 
that of the other acquirers.  
Finally, Type IV acquisitions, which generate both negative abnormal stock returns and abnormal 
accounting performance, were characterised by the use of stock as a means of payment, low 
valuation ratios and some evidence of weak corporate governance. All of these characteristics, 
including the negative performance (independent of how it is measured), suggest that these 
acquisitions are driven by the agency motive as well as Roll’s (1986) hubris argument. According 
to the agency motive (Jensen and Meckling 1976), if left to their own devices, managers will 
invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects (such as value-destroying acquisitions) in 
order to increase their remuneration and status. According to Roll’s thesis, managers simply 
make mistakes when valuing the target in an acquisition. Both arguments explain the 
combination of negative abnormal stock returns and negative abnormal accounting performance.9 
10
 
                                                 
9
 While some studies such as Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) clearly 
distinguish between the agency motive and the hubris motive, this paper does not so. Indeed, the focus of this paper 
is different. Rather than focusing on the link between total gains and target shareholder gains (which is different 
depending on which of the two motives that applies), the focus here is on the link between stock performance and 
accounting profits (which is the same for either motive). 
10
 As a robustness check, we categorize the acquisitions based on the 3-year buy and hold returns (BHARs) starting 
with the announcement date of the deal. Except for some of the corporate governance indices, the significant 
differences between the four types are very similar to those obtained from the descriptives based on the short-term 
CARs. In terms of the corporate governance indices, Type I acquisitions now have significantly worse corporate 
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5. Conclusion 
Studies investigating the wealth effects accruing to the shareholders of acquiring firms have used 
two different approaches to measure such wealth effects. One such approach consists of 
performing an event study on the short-term announcement effects to acquisitions or their long-
term effects. Studies that have adopted the event study approach typically find that the short-term 
effects are either insignificant or significantly negative whereas the long-term effects tend to be 
negative and significant. However, there is granularity with at least one short-term study finding 
significantly positive announcement returns and another long-term study finding insignificant 
cumulative abnormal returns. The other approach of measuring the wealth effects of acquisitions 
to the acquiring shareholders consists of studying abnormal accounting performance following 
the acquisition. While the studies finding a significant improvement in accounting performance 
post-acquisition outnumber the studies finding other performance outcomes, there is granularity – 
similar to what is observed for the case of the event studies – with at least one study finding a 
deterioration in accounting performance and another one finding no change in performance. 
This paper uses both approaches, the event study methodology and the measurement of abnormal 
accounting performance. It finds great variety in terms of performance outcomes as reflected by 
the different combinations of positive or negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and 
positive or negative abnormal accounting performance. In detail, we distinguish between Type I 
(positive CARs and positive abnormal accounting performance), Type II (positive CARs and 
                                                                                                                                                              
governance (as measured by the entrenchment index) whereas Type IV acquisitions have significantly better 
corporate governance. In contrast, Table 6 suggests the opposite with Type IV acquisitions having significantly 
worse corporate governance. The reversal of signs in terms of the corporate governance indices is somewhat difficult 
to interpret. Kothari and Warner (2007) review the econometrics of event studies. They conclude that statistical 
inference from short-term event studies is highly reliable. In contrast, long-term event studies suffer from two major 
shortcomings. First, the statistical tests suffer from a lack of power, i.e. the null hypothesis of there being no 
abnormal returns may not be rejected even when there are seemingly large abnormal returns. Second, events are 
likely to be accompanied by increases in the variance of stock returns, which is likely to result in misspecifications. 
In turn, this would result in the null being rejected more often than it should be. 
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negative abnormal accounting performance), Type III (negative CARs and positive abnormal 
accounting performance) and Type IV (negative CARs and abnormal accounting performance) 
acquisitions.   
Based on a descriptive analysis of a wide range of bidder, bid and target characteristics for a 
sample of more than 4,500 US acquisitions during 1989 and 2008, we find evidence that Type I 
acquisitions are motivated by the exploitation of synergies, whereas Type II acquisitions are 
motivated by preemption (Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005)), Type III acquisitions by the 
overvaluation of the bidder’s stock and market timing (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) and Type IV 
acquisitions by bad corporate governance, respectively. This paper has important implications for 
studies investigating the gains from acquisitions accruing to bidders. Indeed, it suggests that it is 
crucial to take into account the motive behind each acquisition when measuring the wealth gains 
for the bidders. In particular, adjusting for the motives behind an acquisition may explain the 
sometimes contradictory conclusions as to its wealth effects suggested by the event study 
approach and the abnormal accounting performance approach.    
17 
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Table 1: Summary of previous event studies on the wealth effects of M&As 
 
 
Panel A: Short run event studies 
Study Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event 
window 
Acquirer 
CARs 
Asquith et al. (1987) 343 1973 – 83 [−1;±0] −0.85%** 
Varaiya & Ferris (1987) 96 1974 – 83 [−1;±0] −2.15%** 
Bradley et al. (1988) 236 1963−84 [−5;+5] +1%** 
Lang et al. (1989) 87 1968 − 86 [−5;+5] +0.00% 
Servaes (1991) 704 1972−87 [−1;close] −1.07%** 
Byrd & Hickman (1992) 128 1980 − 87 [−1;±0] −1.2%** 
Healy et al. (1992) 50 1979 − 84 [−5;+5] −2.20% 
Kaplan & Weisbach (1992) 209 1971 − 82 [−5;+5] −1.49%** 
Smith & Kim (1994) 177 1980 − 86 [−5;+5] +0.50% 
   [−1;±0] −0.23% 
Mulherin & Boone (2000) 281 1990 − 99 [−1;+1] −0.37% 
Andrade et al. (2001) 3,688 1973 − 98 [−1;+1] −0.70% 
   [−20; close] −3.80% 
Panel B: Long run event studies (Long term returns to acquirers) 
Study Sample 
Size 
Sample 
Period 
Event window 
(months, unless 
otherwise 
stated) 
CARs 
(mergers) 
CARs (tender 
offers) 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) 534 1970 – 89 [1;1250 days] −14.2%** +61.3%** 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 4,316 1980 − 91 [0;36] −4%** +9%** 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 2,068 1961 – 1993 [0;36] 1%  
Andrade et al. (2001) 2,068 1961 – 1993 [0;36] -5.0%**  
 
This table shows the event studies that estimate shareholder wealth effects of mergers in the short and long run. Panel A shows 
the average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the shareholders of the acquirer from the short-run event studies. Panel B 
exhibits the CARs to acquirers found by the long-run event studies. ** and * stand for significance at the 5% level or better and 
significance at the 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Summary of previous accounting performance studies on the wealth effects of 
M&As 
 
 
Study Dataset and performance 
measure used 
 
Results 
 
Time of measurement   
Ravenscraft 
& Scherer 
(1989) 
 
471 companies with and 
without acquisition 
activity between 1950 
and 1977 (not 1970), 
operating income over 
total assets 
Acquisition activity 
significantly reduces 
profit, but level of 
reduction depends on 
accounting method and 
acquisition type. 
1977, 1975-1977   
Healy et al. 
(1992) 
50 largest US mergers 
between 1979 and 1984, 
industry-adjusted 
operating cash flows to 
total assets 
+2.8%** 
 
Median annual 
performance for years 
+1 to +5 
  
Dickerson et 
al. (1997) 
 
613 transactions 
between 1948 and 1977, 
return on assets 
−2.00%*** 
 
Year after the 
acquisition 
  
Ghosh 
(2001) 
315 transactions 
between 1981 and 1995, 
industry-adjusted cash 
flows to total assets 
+0.27% Median change in 
performance between 
3-year pre-merger 
performance and 3-
year post-merger 
performance 
  
Andrade et 
al. (2001) 
Roughly 2,000 
transactions between 
1973 and 1998, industry-
adjusted operating cash 
flows to sales 
+3.15%** Annual performance in 
year t+2 
  
Linn & 
Switzer 
(2001) 
413 acquisitions 
between 1967 and 1987, 
industry-adjusted 
operating cash flows to 
the market value of 
equity and book value of 
debt 
+1.81%*** Median change in 
performance between 
5-year pre-merger 
performance and 5-
year post-merger 
performance  
  
22 
 
Table 2 (continued): Summary of previous accounting performance studies on the wealth 
effects of M&As 
 
Heron and Lie 
(2002) 
859 completed M&As 
between January 1985 
and December 1997, 
operating income scaled 
by sales 
“Regardless of the interval over which the 
change in performance-adjusted operating 
income is measured, the differences are not 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level.” (p. 
147) 
  
Ramaswamy & 
Waegelein 
(2003) 
 
162 transactions 
between. 1975 and 1990, 
the ratio of industry-
adjusted operating cash 
flows to total assets 
+0.127**   
 
Difference in the median industry-
adjusted cash flow return on market 
value of assets of the post-merger 
five years and the corresponding 
pre-merger five years. 
  
 
This table shows the studies that estimate shareholder wealth effects of mergers via accounting performance. 
We show the average abnormal cash flow returns of the combined firms using the particular cash flow 
measure. ** and * stand for significance at the 5% level or better and significance at the 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Pre- and post-merger cash flow returns  
 
 
  Cash flow return 
Abnormal cash flow return 
(industry matched 
portfolio) 
Abnormal cash flow return 
(non-industry matched 
portfolio) 
Year relative 
to 
transaction 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
-3 48.22%*** 44.68%*** -0.05% 3.11 2.26%*** 2.64%*** 
-2 48.61%*** 45.92%*** -1.67%*** 1.38** 0.47% 1.09% 
-1 48.78%*** 46.36%*** -3.51%*** -1.90*** -0.86%* -1.13%* 
1 50.68%*** 46.37%*** -10.11%*** -7.26*** -5.63%*** -7.76%*** 
2 51.64%*** 46.46%*** -9.10%*** -6.61*** -4.79%*** -5.96%*** 
3 50.84%*** 47.80%*** -8.71%*** -5.36%*** -4.66%*** -5.47 %*** 
 
This table presents the acquirer’s mean and median operating cash flow returns for the whole sample. 
Cash flow is defined as sales (CRSP Item 12) minus the cost of goods sold (Item 41) minus selling and 
administrative expenses (Item 189) plus depreciation and goodwill (Item 196). Cash flow is scaled by 
sales measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the merger to form the cash flow return. The table 
displays the mean and median values for each of the three years before and after the merger. Columns 
two and three show the acquirer’s raw cash flow return. Columns four to seven display the abnormal 
cash flow returns of the merging firms compared to the industry matched portfolio and the non-industry 
matched portfolio, respectively. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively, for the two-tailed test that the return is different from zero. 
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Table 4: Definition of the variables 
 
 
Variable Description 
Bidder characteristics 
Leverage The acquirer’s book value of long-term debt (Item 9) over the book value of equity (Item 
60) at the end of the financial year before the announcement of the acquisition. 
Intangible Assets The book value of intangible assets (Item 33) at the end of the financial year before the 
announcement of the acquisition divided by total assets (Item 6) for the same period.  
BtM The book value of equity (Item 60) at the end of the financial year before the announcement 
of the acquisition divided by the market value of equity (Item 25 times Item 199) of the 
acquirer in the month preceding the announcement.   
BtM-market- 
Adjusted 
The BtM of the acquirer minus the median Tobin’s Q of all stocks in the CRSP universe for 
the same period 
Ln(BtM) The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s BtM as defined above 
Ln(BtM market- 
adjusted) 
The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s BtM minus the natural logarithm of the median BtM 
of all stocks in the CRSP universe for the same period. 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the acquirer’s market value of assets to the book value of total assets (Item 6) of 
the acquirer in the financial year before the announcement of the acquisition. As in 
Malmendier and Tate (2007), market value of assets is defined as total assets (Item 6)  plus 
market value of equity (Item 25 times Item 199) minus book value of equity (Item 60). 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q as defined above 
Q-industry-adjusted The acquirer’s Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q of all stocks with the same two-digit 
SIC code for the same period 
Q-market-adjusted The acquirer’s Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q of all stocks in the CRSP universe 
for the same period 
Ln(Q-industry- 
adjusted) 
The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q minus the natural logarithm of the median 
Q of all stocks with the same two-digit SIC code for the same period. 
Ln(Q-market- 
adjusted) 
The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q minus the natural logarithm of the median 
Q of all stocks in the CRSP universe for the same period. 
PE The price-earnings ratio of the acquirer at the end of the month preceding the announcement 
of the acquisition. 
Multiple  
Acquisitions 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the acquirer is involved in more than one 
acquisition over the sample period. 
CG Index 
 
This is the Gompers et al. (2003) index which measures shareholder restrictions in the US. 
The index is incremented by 1 for each provision that restricts shareholder rights (i.e. 
increases managerial power). The index can potentially range from 1 to 24 
CG Dictatorship  
Index 
The Dictatorship Index is based on the Gompers et al. (2003) index. The authors call the 
portfolio of companies with an index value of at least 14 the “dictatorship portfolio”. The 
CG Dictatorship Index is equal to the value for the CG index if it is at least 14 and zero 
otherwise 
Entrenchment  
Index 
The Entrenchment Index is based on the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. The 
index is incremented by 1 for each of 4 possible provisions that reduce shareholder voting 
power and 2 provisions that prevent hostile takeovers. The entrenchment index is measured 
for all firms without dual-class stock followed by the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) 
Bid characteristics 
% Cash Payment The share of cash expressed as a percentage of the total payment for the acquisition 
% Other Payment The share of other payment methods (Percentage of consideration paid in other then cash or 
stock: Total value minus value paid in cash and stock divided by total value; consideration 
sought: All types of consideration sought by the acquirer: common or ordinary shares (for 
public targets), options, convertible preferred shares, assets, stock (for private targets)) 
expressed as a percentage of the total payment for the acquisition 
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Table 4 (continued): Definition of the variables 
 
 
% Stock Payment The share of stock expressed as a percentage of the total acquisition payment for the 
acquisition 
Majority Cash  
Payment 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if at least 50.1 % of the acquisition 
payment is made by cash and is set to zero otherwise 
Majority Other  
Payment 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if at least 50.1 % of the acquisition 
payment is made by payment forms other than stock and cash and is set to zero otherwise 
Majority Stock  
Payment 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if at least 50.1 % of the acquisition 
payment is made by stock and is set to zero otherwise 
Analysts’ Revision 
Dummy 
This a dummy variable set to one if the number of analysts making an upward revision in 
the quarter following the announcement of the acquisition is larger than the number of 
analysts making a downward revision. All forecasts are for the acquiring firm in the 
financial year following the year of the acquisition announcement 
Analysts’ Revision  
Median 
The median of the ratio of (IBES Earnings Consensus Mean Post-Acquisition / closing price 
of the first trading day in the month of the forecast  IBES Consensus Mean Pre/ closing 
price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast) to IBES Consensus Mean Pre-
Acquisition / closing price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast. The pre-
acquisition period is defined as the quarter preceding the quarter with the announcement day 
and the post-acquisition period is quarter following the announcement. All forecasts are for 
the acquiring firm in the financial year following the year of the acquisition announcement 
Analysts’ Revision  
Mean 
The mean of the ratio of (IBES Earnings Consensus Mean Post-Acquisition / closing price 
of the first trading day in the month of the forecast  IBES Consensus Mean Pre / closing 
price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast) to IBES Consensus Mean Pre-
Acquisition / closing price of the first trading day in the month of the forecast. The pre- and 
post-acquisition periods are as defined above. All forecasts are for the acquiring firm in the 
financial year following the year of the acquisition announcement 
Industry CARs  
[X;+X] The median abnormal returns of the acquirer’s industry over the [X;+X] event window centred on the announcement day of the acquisition. The industry classification is based on 
the two-digit SIC codes 
Target characteristics 
Industry Closeness Industry closeness is a categorical variable which measures how close the acquirer’s and 
target’s industries are. The variable equals zero if both industries have a different first digit 
for their SIC code, one if they both have the same first digit for their SIC code, three if the 
two first digits of their SIC codes are the same and four if the four-digit SIC codes are 
identical. 
Leverage of 
Target 
The target’s book value of long-term debt (Item 9) over the book value of equity (Item 60) 
at the end of the financial year before the announcement of the acquisition. 
CG Target 
 
This is the Gompers et al. (2003) index for the target firms which measures shareholder–
rights restrictions. The index is incremented by 1 for each provision that restricts 
shareholder rights (i.e. increases managerial power). The index can potentially range from 1 
to 24 
 
This table contains the definitions of all the variables used in this study, except for the abnormal accounting 
performance and the abnormal stock returns which are defined in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, respectively. 
Financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT, data on analyst forecasts are from IBES and stock price data are 
from CRSP. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics – Acquisition type classification based on CARs [-2;+2] (non-industry-matched portfolio) 
 
 
 
Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 
All 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
% Cash Payment 60.59*** 100.00*** 62.99*** 93.01*** 49.63*** 47.40*** 51.11* 50.68* 55.61 74.8 
% Other Payment 7.72 0.00 8.29 0.00 7.67 0.00 7.74 0.00 7.91 0.00 
% Stock Payment 31.68*** 0.00*** 21.11** 0.00** 42.69*** 20.11*** 41.15** 8.70* 36.46 0.00 
Majority Cash Payment 
 
0. 61*** 1.00*** 0.64*** 1.00*** 0.49*** 0.00*** 0.50** 1.00** 55.61 1.00 
Majority Other Payment 
 
0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04   0.00 0.05 0.00 
Majority Stock Payment 
 
0.30*** 0.00 0.28*** 0.00 0.43*** 0.00 0.43** 0.00 0.36 0.00 
Tobin’s Q 2. 91 1.83 3.04 1.77 3.10 2.04 2.80 1.90 2.98 1.91 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 0.79 0.60 0.76 0.58 0.85* 0.71* 0.80 0.64 0.80 0.65 
Q-Market Adjusted 
 
1.56 0.47 1.69 0.42 1.76 0.66* 1.46 0.60 1.63 0.56 
Q-Industry Adjusted 
 
0. 57 -0.21 0.68 -0.17 0.63 -0.13 0.28 -0.13 0.56 -0.13 
Ln(Q-Market Adjusted) 
 
0.49 0.29 0.47 0.27 0.55* 0.39* 0.52 0.40 0.51 0.35 
Ln(Q-Industry Adjusted) 
 
0.99* 0.77* 0.90 0.75 0.89 0.72 0.88 0.70 0.92 0.76 
BtM 0.37 0.34 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.36** 0.30** 0.37 0.33 0.38 0.36 
Ln (BtM) -1.23 -1.07 -1.05*** -0.96*** -1.29*** -1.21*** -1.18 -1.09 -1.21 -1.12 
BtM-Market Adjusted 
 
-0.09 -0.02 -0.03** -0.07** -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.14 
Ln(BtM-Market Adjusted) 
 
-0.46 -0.28 -0.28*** -0.17*** -0.53*** -0.45*** -0.41 -0.29 -0.44 -0.34 
PE 7.41 20.82 19.73 18.82 17.83 21.33 36.89* 19.57 17.96 20.35 
Analysts‘ Revision Mean 
 
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.20* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Analysts‘ Revision Median 
 
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.23* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Analysts‘ Revision Dummy 0.40*** 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.31* 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Industry Closeness 1.81 2.00 1.87 2.00 2.08 2.00 2.06 2.00 1.89 2.00 
CG Index Acq 
 
9.14 9.00 8.56** 8.00** 8.99 9.00 8.77 9.00 8.92 9.00 
Dictatorship Index 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 
 
0.00 
Entrenchment Index 2.10* 2.00 1.86** 2.00 2.04 2.00 2.03 2.00 2.03 2.00 
Industry CARs[-2; +2] -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
CG Index Target 
 
8.69 9.00 8.50 8.00 9.18 9.00 9.13 9.00 9.00 9.00 
Multiple Bids 0.69 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.72 1.00 
Leverage Acq 0.16 0.43 0.42 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.34 0.34 
Intangible Assets 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.12 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the four different types. An acquisition is of Type I if both its CAR [-2;+2] and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are positive, of 
Type II if its CAR is positive and its non-industry adjusted accounting performance is negative, of Type III if its CAR is negative and its non-industry adjusted accounting performance 
is positive, and of Type IV if its CAR and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are both negative. Acquirers with negative BtM ratios and those with negative PE ratios are 
excluded. Accounting performance is measured as the difference between the average accounting performance across the three years following the year of the announcement and the 
average accounting performance across the three years preceding that year minus the corresponding difference for the matched portfolio. The variables are defined in Table 4. We carry 
out a simple t-test (for the mean) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (for the median) for each variable. For the categorical variables “majority cash payment”, “majority other payment” 
and “majority stock payment”, the test statistic is a Pearson chi-square test which assumes a binomial distribution. The null hypothesis states that the mean (median) of the respective 
type is equal to the mean (median) for the three remaining types. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics – Acquisition type classification based on CARs [-2;+2] (industry-matched portfolio) 
 
 
 
Type I Type II Type III Type IV 
 
All 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
% Cash Payment 59.16** 85.17** 65.29*** 97.89*** 49.74*** 47.55*** 50.88** 50.68** 55.61 74.8 
% Other Payment 7.75 0.00 8.19 0.00 7.39 0.00 8.28 0.00 7.91 0.00 
% Stock Payment 33.10** 0.00** 26.51*** 0.00*** 42.85*** 16.00** 40.82*** 16.35** 36.46 0.00 
Majority Cash Payment 
 
0.60** 1.00** 0.66*** 1.00*** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.50*** 1.00*** 55.61 1.00 
Majority Other Payment 
 
0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Majority Stock Payment 
 
0.33** 0.00 0.25** 0.00 0.43** 0.00 0.41** 0.00 0.36 0.00 
Tobin’s Q 3.16 1.99 2.60** 1.68*** 3.20* 2.08 2.63** 1.73* 2.98 1.91 
Ln (Tobin’s Q) 0.83 0.69 0.70*** 0.52*** 0.87 0.72 0.74* 0.53* 0.80 0.65 
Q-Market Adjusted 
 
1.81 0.59 1.25** 0.32*** 1.86* 0.73** 1.27* 0.43* 1.63 0.56 
Q-Industry Adjusted 
 
0.77* -0.09 0.32 -0.16 0.66 -0.17 0.22* -0.11 0.56 -0.13 
Ln(Q-Market Adjusted) 
 
0.53 0.36 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.59*** 0.43*** 0.45* 0.29 0.51 0.35 
Ln(Q-Industry Adjusted) 
 
0.98 0.80 0.93 0.83 0.87 0.69** 0.93 0.82 0.92 0.76 
BtM 0.36 0.30** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.34** 0.28*** 0.38** 0.36** 0.38 0.32 
Ln (BtM) -1.27** -1.17** -0.99*** -0.88*** -1.32*** -1.24*** -1.12** -1.00** -1.21 -1.12 
BtM-Market Adjusted 
 
-0.10 -0.15* -0.01*** -0.06*** -0.12 -0.18** -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 
Ln(BtM-Market Adjusted) 
 
-0.51** -0.40** -0.22*** -0.10*** -0.56** -0.48*** -0.36** -0.23** -0.44 -0.34 
PE 19.19 21.30* 0.10*** 17.81*** 26.44 21.97* 20.05 18.17* 17.96 20.35 
Analysts‘ Revision Mean 
 
-0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Analysts‘ Revision Median 
 
-0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Analysts‘ Revision Dummy 0.40*** 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.31* 0.00 0.35 0.00 
Industry Closeness 1.83 2.00 1.83 2.00 1.94 2.00 1.95 2.00 1.89 2.00 
CG Index Acq 
 
8.90 9.00 8.84 0.00 8.97 9.00 8.80 9.00 8.92 9.00 
Dictatorship Index 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04** 0.00 0.08* 0.00 0.05 
 
0.00 
Entrenchment Index 2.04 2.00 1.97 2.00 2.03 2.00 2.05 2.00 2.03 2.00 
Industry CARs[-2; +2] -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
CG Index Target 
 
8.55 8.00 8.73 8.00 9.31 9.00 8.93 9.00 9.00 9.00 
Multiple Bids 0.70 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.72 1.00 
Leverage Acq 0.55 0.36 0.30 0.37 0.56 0.44 0.20 0.32 0.34 0.34 
Intangible Assets 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.12 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the four different types. An acquisition is of Type I if both its CAR [-2;+2] and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are positive, of 
Type II if its CAR is positive and its non-industry adjusted accounting performance is negative, of Type III if its CAR is negative and its non-industry adjusted accounting performance 
is positive, and of Type IV if its CAR and non-industry adjusted accounting performance are both negative. Acquirers with negative BtM ratios and those with negative PE ratios are 
excluded. Accounting performance is measured as the difference between the average accounting performance across the three years following the year of the announcement and the 
average accounting performance across the three years preceding that year minus the corresponding difference for the matched portfolio. The variables are defined in Table 4. We carry 
out a simple t-test (for the mean) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (for the median) for each variable. For the categorical variables “majority cash payment”, “majority other payment” 
and “majority stock payment”, the test statistic is a Pearson chi-square test which assumes a binomial distribution. The null hypothesis states that the mean (median) of the respective 
type is equal to the mean (median) for three remaining types. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
